what is it like to be a bat explained

1974 paper by American philosopher Thomas Nagel

Thomas Nagel argues that while a human might be able to imagine what it is like to exist a bat by taking "the bat's point of view", information technology would still be impossible "to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat." (Townsend's large-eared bat pictured).

"What Is Information technology Like to Exist a Bat?" is a paper by American philosopher Thomas Nagel, first published in The Philosophical Review in Oct 1974, and later in Nagel'south Mortal Questions (1979). The paper presents several difficulties posed by consciousness, including the possible insolubility of the listen-body problem owing to "facts across the reach of human concepts", the limits of objectivity and reductionism, the "phenomenological features" of subjective experience, the limits of human imagination, and what it means to be a particular, conscious thing.^[1]

Nagel famously asserts that "an organism has witting mental states if and merely if there is something that information technology is similar to be that organism—something it is like for the organism."^[2] This exclamation has achieved special status in consciousness studies as "the standard 'what it's like' locution."^[3] Daniel Dennett, while sharply disagreeing on some points, acknowledged Nagel's paper as "the most widely cited and influential thought experiment about consciousness."^{[4] : 441}

Thesis [edit]

Nagel challenges the possibility of explaining "the nigh of import and characteristic characteristic of conscious mental phenomena" by reductive materialism (the philosophical position that all statements near the mind and mental states can exist translated, without any loss or change in meaning, into statements most the physical). For example, a reductive physicalist'south solution to the mind–body problem holds that whatsoever "consciousness" is, it can be fully described via physical processes in the brain and body.^[five]

Nagel begins by bold that "witting feel is a widespread phenomenon" present in many animals (specially mammals), even though it is "difficult to say [...] what provides evidence of information technology." Thus, Nagel sees consciousness not equally something exclusively man, merely as something shared past many, if non all, organisms. Nagel must be speaking of something other than sensory perception, since objective facts and widespread evidence show that organisms with sensory organs have biological processes of sensory perception. In fact, what all organisms share, according to Nagel, is what he calls the "subjective character of experience" defined as follows: "An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that information technology is like to be that organism – something that it is like for the organism."^[1]

The paper argues that the subjective nature of consciousness undermines any attempt to explain consciousness via objective, reductionist means. The subjective character of experience cannot be explained by a organisation of functional or intentional states. Consciousness cannot be fully explained if the subjective character of experience is ignored, and the subjective character of experience cannot be explained by a reductionist; it is a mental phenomenon that cannot be reduced to materialism.^[6] Thus, for consciousness to be explained from a reductionist stance, the idea of the subjective character of experience would have to be discarded, which is absurd. Neither tin can a physicalist view, because in such a world each phenomenal experience had by a witting beingness would take to have a physical property attributed to it, which is impossible to prove due to the subjectivity of conscious feel. Nagel argues that each and every subjective feel is connected with a "unmarried bespeak of view", making it infeasible to consider whatever conscious experience as "objective".

Nagel uses the metaphor of bats to clarify the distinction between subjective and objective concepts. Because bats are mammals, they are assumed to have conscious experience. Nagel was inspired to utilize a bat for his argument after living in a domicile where the animals were frequent visitors. Nagel ultimately used bats for his argument considering of their highly evolved and active use of a biological sensory apparatus that is significantly different from that of many other organisms. Bats utilise echolocation to navigate and perceive objects. This method of perception is similar to the human sense of vision. Both sonar and vision are regarded as perceptual experiences. While it is possible to imagine what it would be like to fly, navigate by sonar, hang upside down and eat insects similar a bat, that is not the same as a bat'southward perspective. Nagel claims that even if humans were able to metamorphose gradually into bats, their brains would not accept been wired as a bat's from birth; therefore, they would only exist able to experience the life and behaviors of a bat, rather than the mindset.^[seven]

Such is the difference between subjective and objective points of view. According to Nagel, "our own mental activity is the only unquestionable fact of our experience", meaning that each private but knows what it is similar to be them (subjectivism). Objectivity requires an unbiased, non-subjective state of perception. For Nagel, the objective perspective is non feasible, because humans are limited to subjective experience.

Nagel concludes with the contention that it would exist wrong to presume that physicalism is incorrect, since that position is also imperfectly understood. Physicalism claims that states and events are concrete, simply those concrete states and events are merely imperfectly characterized. Nevertheless, he holds that physicalism cannot be understood without characterizing objective and subjective experience. That is a necessary precondition for understanding the mind-body problem.

Criticisms [edit]

Daniel Dennett denies Nagel's merits that the bat's consciousness is inaccessible, contending that any "interesting or theoretically of import" features of a bat's consciousness would be amenable to tertiary-person observation.^{[iv] : 442} For instance, it is clear that bats cannot discover objects more than than a few meters away because echolocation has a limited range. Dennett holds that any similar aspects of its experiences could be gleaned by further scientific experiments.^{[four] : 443} Kathleen Akins similarly argued that many questions nearly a bat's subjective experience hinge on unanswered questions nearly the neuroscientific details of a bat's brain (such equally the function of cortical activeness profiles), and Nagel is too quick in ruling these out as answers to his cardinal question.^{[8] [nine]}

Peter Hacker analyzes Nagel's statement as not only "malconstructed" but philosophically "misconceived" as a definition of consciousness,^[x] and he asserts that Nagel's paper "laid the groundwork for…forty years of fresh confusion near consciousness."^{[11] : 13}

Eric Schwitzgebel and Michael S. Gordon accept argued that, contrary to Nagel, normal sighted humans do apply echolocation much like bats - information technology is just that it is mostly washed without i's awareness. They use this to argue that normal people in normal circumstances tin can be grossly and systematically mistaken virtually their conscious experience.^[12]

Run across also [edit]

• Fauna consciousness
• Intersubjectivity
• Qualia
• Umwelt

References [edit]

1. ^ ^{a b} Nagel, Thomas (x March 2005). Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 637. ISBN978-0-19-103747-4.
2. ^ Nagel, Thomas (1974). "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?". The Philosophical Review. 83 (iv): 435–450. doi:ten.2307/2183914. JSTOR 2183914.
3. ^ Levine, Joseph (2010). Review of Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Notre Matriarch Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3).
4. ^ ^{a b c} Dennett, Daniel C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Piffling, Brown and Company.
5. ^ Wimsatt, William C (1976). Reductionism, Levels of Organization, and the Listen-Torso Problem. Springer US. pp. 205–267. ISBN978-1-4684-2198-9.
6. ^ "Qualia | Cyberspace Encyclopedia of Philosophy". www.iep.utm.edu . Retrieved 2015-06-01 .
7. ^ De Preester, Helena (2007). "The deep actual origins of the subjective perspective: Models and their bug". Consciousness and Noesis. 16 (3): 604–618. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.05.002.
8. ^ Bickle, John; Mandik, Peter; Landreth, Anthony. "The Philosophy of Neuroscience". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford. Retrieved 2 September 2020. Kathleen Akins (1993a) delved deeper into existing cognition of bat physiology and reports much that is pertinent to Nagel's question. She argued that many of the questions about bat subjective experience that we still consider open swivel on questions that remain unanswered about neuroscientific details. I example of the latter is the part of various cortical activity profiles in the active bat.
9. ^ Akins, Kathleen (1993). "What is information technology Similar to be Boring and Myopic". In Dahlbom, Bo (ed.). Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind (PDF). Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. p. 125-160. ISBN0-631-18549-six.
10. ^ Hacker, P.Yard.Due south. (2002). "Is there annihilation information technology is like to be a bat?" (pdf). Philosophy. 77: 157–174. doi:ten.1017/s0031819102000220.
11. ^ Hacker, P.M.Due south. (2012). "The Sad and Sorry History of Consciousness: being, amidst other things, a challenge to the "consciousness-studies community"" (pdf). Royal Constitute of Philosophy. supplementary volume 70.
12. ^ Schwitzgebel, Eric; Gordon, Michael Southward. (2000). "How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience?: The Instance of Human being Echolocation". Philosophical Topics. 28 (ii): 235–246.

Further reading [edit]

• "What is it similar to be a bat?". Philosophical Review. LXXXIII (four): 435–450. Oct 1974. doi:ten.2307/2183914.
• Hacker, P.Thou.S. (2002). "Is there anything information technology is like to be a bat?" (pdf). Philosophy. 77: 157–174. doi:10.1017/s0031819102000220.
• Schwitzgebel, Eric (2020-12-23). "Is There Something It's Like to Exist a Garden Snail?" (PDF). {{cite spider web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)

colemanuntly1961.blogspot.com

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_It_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%3F

Share this post